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From Constitutions to Constitutionalism in 
Arab States: Beyond Paradox to Opportunity 
Asem Khalil*
Abstract
In this paper, I suggest that we consider constitutionalism as an opportunity for contemporary
Arab states. I begin by arguing that modern constitutionalism at its core involves the idea of
government limited by a concern to restrict states’ margins of manoeuvrability by imposing
limitations on them in the name of rule of law and human rights imperatives. These limitations are
articulated and defended, explicitly or implicitly, in the name of some higher normative order that
embraces the primacy of individual freedoms and of equality. 
But modern constitutionalism, so understood, is deemed to generate a paradox with which
contemporary states need to coexist. This paradox is that the constitution is both sourced in
particularistic consent and in universal, ‘higher’ normativity. While such paradox is often portrayed
as being particularly problematic for Arab or Islamic states given certain historical and cultural
particularities, I will argue—against the conventional wisdom of the previous viewpoint—that the
problem of particularism is in fact endemic within modern constitutionalism. 
Besides the doctrinal disagreement about what constitutionalism is in the first place, scepticism
expressed towards modern constitutionalism is the result of framing the issue of resistance of
contemporary states as a matter of ‘legitimacy’. I will refute such arguments that justify rejection
of modern constitutionalism in the name of religious or cultural particularities, arguing instead that
those who use such arguments are simply looking at new realities through old lenses. 
Accordingly, the main concern of this paper is not to reconcile modern constitutionalism with
Arab and Islamic culture; rather it is to show that the core problem lies elsewhere. The issue at stake
is to be able to explain and justify why and how it is possible for state powers to be limited by a
superior normative order, notably one in which human rights is an essential part. In fact, whenever
human rights normativity is also associated with international law or transnationalised discourses
and not merely with the state’s own positive constitutional law, different questions are generated
and need to be dealt with than the ones that appear to be central prima facie. In fact, the general
outlook may be brightened by the recent internationalisation of constitutional law and its
influences.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I suggest that we consider constitutionalism as an opportunity for
contemporary Arab states faced with an urgent need not only to explain their authority
and to enhance their legitimacy but also to provide a rational justification for their
existence as states. 
I begin, in the essay’s first section, by arguing that modern constitutionalism at its core
involves the idea of government both by and for the governed people and limited by a
concern to restrict states’ margins of manoeuvrability by imposing limitations in the
name of rule of law and human rights imperatives. These limitations are articulated and
defended, explicitly or implicitly, in the name of some higher normative order that
embraces the primacy of individual freedoms and of equality. But, modern consti-
tutionalism, so understood, is deemed to generate a paradox with which contemporary
states need to coexist, and as such represents a challenging dilemma that constitution-
makers in contemporary states, especially the newly established ones, need to deal with
(Section II). This paradox is that the constitution is both subordinate to and dominant
over the will of the people, is sourced in both particularistic consent (the will of this
people, its history and its values) and in universal, ‘higher’ normativity.
I then argue that Arab states have passed through different stages of constitutional
development. Most Arab states opted for written constitutions and they have shown an
interest in constitutionalism. However, constitutional documents did not help in bridging
the gap between constitutional texts and political reality—an experience that, sadly, is
common in, although not exclusive to, the Arab world (Section III).
For that reason, the paradox inherent in modern constitutionalism is often portrayed
as being particularly problematic for Arab or Islamic states given certain historical and
cultural particularities. These include the prevalence of an ethically ‘thick’ and dominant
religious law, the slow development of democracy, and the grounding of cultural identity
in a pan-Arabic and/or Islamic sense of community which goes beyond the particular
national community (Section IV).
Against the conventional wisdom of the previous viewpoint, I will argue that the
problem of particularism is in fact endemic within modern constitutionalism. All states,
Western, Arab and Islamic alike, must address the problem of the ‘disconnect’ between
the ‘particular’ source of legitimation and collective motivation and the ‘universal’ force
of an argument that would restrain collective power in the name of individual rights,
democratic choice in the name of equality, and national sovereignty in the name of
human rights (Section V).
Indeed, once one recognises this, one can view the Arab situation in a more positive
constitutional light. The absence of strong forms of cultural nationalism, religious
identity, or even popular sovereignty at a level coincidental to the state can lead to a form
of statism which may instead be more secular and more open to a sense of limited
422 Transnational Legal Theory
government, a possibility enhanced by certain understandings of the freedom-protecting
content of Islamic law (Section VI). 
I will finally argue that, whether in East or West, the situation is complicated, but also
that the general outlook may have become brighter by virtue of the recent international-
isation of constitutional law and its influences. The logically ‘universal’ government-
limiting constitutionalist counterpoint to thick particularism increasingly takes the form
of a kind of substantive ‘universal’ or global strain of thought and influence formed
around human rights treaties and the migration of constitutional ideas (Section VII).
II. MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM
The ‘constitution’, which has tended to be identified since the eighteenth century with a
single document governing the government, has its roots in the American and French
Revolutions.1 Since then, the diffusion of written constitutions, and the ideas that
supported it,2 is remarkable.3 In Dahrendorf’s three-stage universal sequence of state-
building, writing a constitution is the very first.4 Nowadays, very few states are without
any form of formally drafted or codified constitution.5 A single ‘written constitution’,
even if deemed unnecessary for certain old democracies,6 is increasingly considered the
best way for new nations to ‘write down’ their constitutional commitments and
compromises.7 For many who adopt this approach, written constitutions play a crucial
instrumental role, as a text that serves, by providing a common focal point for political
cohesion, a highly valuable goal for new states.8
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1 See ECS Wade, G Godfrey Philips and AW Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Longman, 9th
edn 1977) 2; Joseph Barthélémy and Paul Duez, Traité de droit constitutionnel (Economica, 1985) 188–91.
2 According to Esmein, the eighteenth century concept of constitution as a fundamental and systematic
written law is based on three ideas: (1) the superiority of a written law; (2) the new constitution is deemed
a renewal of the social contract; (3) the systematic presentation of a constitutional document provides an
excellent means of political education. See Adhémar Esmein, Eléments de droit constitutionnel français et
comparé (Sirey, 8th edn 1927) 603–4.
3 For an overview of the different stages in world constitutional history, see generally Saïd Amir Arjomand,
‘Constitutional Development and Political Reconstruction from Nation-Building to New Constitutionalism’
in Saïd Amir Arjomand (ed), Constitutionalism and Political Reconstruction (Brill, 2007) 6–7; Julian Go,
‘A Globalizing Constitutionalism? Views from the Postcolony, 1945–2000’ in Arjomand, ibid, 89. 
4 See Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (Chatto and Windus, 1990) 3. Cited in Go (n 3)
111.
5 See Jan-Erik Lane, Constitutions and Political Theory (Manchester University Press, 1996) 135. 
6 See Bruce Ackerman, ‘The Living Constitution’ (2007) 120 Harvard Law Review 1741. 
7 See Arjomand (n 3) 6–7.
8 See eg TV Sathyamurthy, ‘The Constitution as an Instrument of Political Cohesion in Postcolonial States:
The Case of India, 1950–1993’ in Designs for Democratic Stability: Studies in Viable Constitutionalism
(ME Sharpe, 1997) 147. 
Nonetheless, the gap that often exists between constitutional texts and the
constitutional realities of many contemporary states makes it possible to doubt the
interconnection between written constitutions on the one side and political cohesion on
the other. It also makes it questionable why contemporary states continue to be interested
in written constitutions in general, and in a specific kind of constitution in particular.
Accordingly, a second approach advances a different explanation: the ‘worldwide embrace
of written constitutions’9 can be explained by the fact that written constitutions are
considered as a legitimating tool for newly established states within the community of
nations. Based on empirical comparative study, some scholars have argued that this
applies to postcolonial states in particular.10
Whether one opts for an inwardly focused instrumentalist approach to written
constitutions or explains one’s attachment to a canonical text by reference to the
externally oriented legitimating role it plays, it would seem that not just any constitutional
text would be fine. Certain imperatives have become (that is, have come to be commonly
viewed as) indispensable. Such imperatives may vary but are often regrouped under the
very generic term ‘constitutionalism’—often referred to without agreement necessarily as
to its meaning.11 Of course, not all constitutions conform to the demands of
constitutionalism, and constitutionalism is not dependent on the existence of written
constitutions. However, as pointed out by Rosenfeld, ‘the realization of the spirit of
constitutionalism generally goes hand in hand with the implementation of written
constitution’.12 Still, the problem is indeed in this interconnection—often constructed
theoretically—and the balance—often kept artificially—between constitutions as an
expression of national sovereignty and constitutionalism as a limitation on the sovereign’s
margin of manoeuvrability, in particular whenever it comes to the right to replace an
existing constitution with a new one.13
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9 Ackerman (n 6) 1800.
10 See Go (n 3) 92. 
11 One of those definitions is provided by Rosenfeld: ‘There appears to be no accepted definition of
constitutionalism but, in the broadest terms, modern constitutionalism requires imposing limits on the
powers of government, adherence to the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental rights.’ Michel
Rosenfeld, ‘Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay between Identity and Diversity’ in Michel Rosenfeld
(ed), Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives (Duke University Press,
1994) 3. Unless otherwise indicated, this is the definition I adopt in this paper whenever I make reference
to ‘modern constitutionalism’. 
12 Ibid. 
13 There are different possible answers in contemporary constitutional and political theory to the question of
constituent power. Loughlin and Walker summarised at least four: (i) the juridical containment thesis (eg
Rawls); (ii) the co-originality and mutual articulation thesis (eg Habermas); (iii) the radical potential thesis
(eg Negri); and (iv) the irresolution thesis (eg Benjamin, Agamben). Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker,
‘Introduction’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism (Oxford
University Press, 2007) 6–7. 
A constitution, indeed, presumes the existence of a constituent power, distinct from
the constituted powers, which are created by the constitution itself. If one admits that the
constituent power refers to a pre-existing collective, that is, a ‘We’ that is aware of itself
as a collective and that is able to will and to express that will in a comprehensive and
distinctive way, then one cannot deny the simple, albeit implied, conclusion: a constituent
power entails a representative claiming to talk in the name of that ‘We’.14 This leads to the
paradox of constitutionalism, to which some scholars refer. Loughlin and Walker, for
example, argued in their recent book: 
Modern constitutionalism is underpinned by two fundamental though antagonistic
imperatives: that governmental power ultimately is generated from the ‘consent of the people’
and that, to be sustained and effective, such power must be divided, constrained, and exercised
through distinctive institutional forms. The people, in Maistre’s words, ‘are a sovereign that
cannot exercise sovereignty’; the power they possess, it would appear, can only be exercised
through constitutional forms already established or in the process of being established. This
indicated what, in its most elementary formulation, might be called the paradox of
constitutionalism.15
Others, such as Bellamy, use ‘paradox’ not to describe constitutionalism as such, but
rather to describe its possible accommodation with other concepts such as sovereignty
and/or democracy: 
Constitutionalism, democracy and sovereignty are both complementary and conflicting terms.
At one level, the constitutional desire to subject the exercise of state power to certain normative
limits appears to be at odds with both assertions of popular and national sovereignty and the
related view that the only legitimate source of law or value lies with the people and the
institutions that embody their will. At another level, constitutions may be seen as providing the
rules and institutional mechanisms necessary to give expression to that will.16
The two imperatives of modern constitutionalism are, indeed, that governmental power,
on the one hand, is generated by the ‘consent of the people’ and, on the other hand, such
power, in order to be sustained and effective, must be divided, constrained and exercised
through distinctive institutional forms.17 This paradox reflects the dilemma that arises
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14 See Hans Lindahl, ‘Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of Collective Selfhood’
in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, 2007)
9–26.
15 Loughlin and Walker (n 13) 1. For a critical analysis of such an approach, see DJ Galligan, ‘The Paradox of
Constitutionalism or the Potential of Constitutional Theory’ (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 343.
16 Richard Bellamy, ‘Introduction: Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty’ in Richard Bellamy (ed),
Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives (Avebury, 1996) 1. It is
within this last precision that I make use of the ‘paradox of constitutionalism’ in this paper.
17 See Loughlin and Walker (n 13) 1.
from the dialectical interaction between constituent power and constitutional form,
between democracy, conceived as the rule of the people, and the rule of law.18
The only way out seems to be the adoption of a specific concept of democracy that
is nothing else but a political organisation, that, appealing to the rule of law, postpones
the acts of attribution by establishing the minimal conditions under which such acts may
be viewed, ever provisionally, as acts of the people.19 This suggestion has the advantage
of providing a coherent reading for constitutionalism: the rule of law is presented as a
camouflage, in which the appearance of attribution to the people is presented as a justified
alternative to the real attribution. 
In a sense, however, it seems that the camouflage is a necessary, almost inevitable,
fiction; largely because it is impossible to know what the people want—admitting in the
first place that the people can ever have one unique will20—and, most importantly,
because even those who pretend to know what the people want and pretend to have the
authority to express that will are—if they want to be coherent with what they pretend—
always subject and subordinate to the continuously changing will of the people. In other
words, it is by their same presupposition (expressing the people’s will) that they may be
discredited or even resisted by other competing authorities. Such a situation leads
inevitably to what can be described as a continuous and perpetual revolution, the complete
opposite of political organisation. 
Accordingly, the rejection of constitutionalism in modern states in the name of the
‘people’ is nothing but a contradiction at best, and a fallacy at worst. Indeed, the simple
fact that a people are defined by a political organisation in the first place means that the
time of complete revolution is over and the fiction of minimal attribution has already
started. In such a context, the reference to ‘the people’ in the abstract to reject limitation
on government is only an excuse for extant regimes to resist transition to democracy and
to the rule of law. This is particularly true in the case of modern constitutionalism where
democracy is enhanced by individual freedoms and equality, while the rule of law is
strengthened by limiting the government and by ensuring respect for human rights. 
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18 In this paper I connect constitutions with the rule of law. Constitutions are indeed relevant because they
enable rule by law (ie the government itself subjects its will to the constraints of the law) as much as rule
through law (ie the ruler’s employment of law for his or her acts of domination). Those are arguably the two
meanings of the rule of law. Ulrich K Preuss, ‘The Political Meaning of Constitutionalism’ in Bellamy (n 16)
16.
19 See Lindahl (n 14) 24.
20 It is true that the people are assimilated with a subject, but the people are never an ‘I’ but always a ‘We’.
Accordingly, the people by definition is always plural, and its will is by definition multiple. The fiction is in
pretending that the ‘We’ have spoken as an ‘I’ and that democracy—perceived as the rule of the majority—
as much as the rule of law are the tools that make this possible.
III. CONSTITUTIONS IN A NON-CONSTITUTIONAL WORLD
Arab states passed through what have been understood as the different stages of
constitutional development.21 They have shared an overwhelming interest in written and
rigid constitutions, adopted constitutional structures similar to those existent in many
other countries, and shown an interest in constitutionalism in general—an interest to be
considered with caution, though, because it does not signal a discontinuity with the past.22
In the 1990s, a new era of ‘transition to democracy’ took place, especially in the post-
Communist countries of Eastern Europe and Russia.23 Arab states were not particularly
different;24 many Arab constitutions, indeed, were re-written, amended, or even adopted
for the first time in this new era.25
A panoramic review of constitutional developments in the Arab world shows that,
despite their constitutional texts having much in common, each State has its own
constitutional history. Constitutional structures vary according to the state concerned,
and the role of written constitutions varies in each country.26 This means that any
generalisation when dealing with Arab states, such as the one the very title of this paper
may have suggested, is at best irrelevant and at worst counterproductive and misleading.27
Still, conflation aside, Arab states have many elements in common. The principle of
popular sovereignty,28 or national sovereignty,29 is included in most Arab constitutions
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21 For a comprehensive overview of the different stages of constitutional movement in the Arab world, see
Nathan Brown, ‘Regimes Reinventing Themselves: Constitutional Development in the Arab World’ in
Arjomand (n 3) 47. 
22 Ibid, 48–49. 
23 See generally Cindy Skach, ‘The “Newest” Separation of Powers: Semipresidentialism’ (2007) 5 International
Journal of Constitutional Law 96; Arjomand (n 3) 3; Wiktor Osiatynski, ‘Paradoxes of Constitutional
Borrowing’ (2003) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 249; Martin Loughlin, ‘Constitutional
Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 189; Jon Elster,
‘Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction’ (1991) 58 University of Chicago Law Review 447;
Bruce Ackerman, ‘The New Separation of Powers’ (2000) 113 Harvard Law Review 633–729; Go (n 3) 
97–98, 103. 
24 Nathan Brown calls this period ‘constitutional experimentation’ while questioning whether or not it could
be considered as a ‘Fourth Constitutional Moment’. Brown (n 21) 56.
25 For examples and cases see Brown (n 21) 56–66. 
26 For an overview of the existing constitutional structures and texts, see generally Asem Khalil, The Enactment
of Constituent Power in the Arab World: The Palestinian Case (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2006) 157–9; Eric
Canal-Forgues, Recueil des constitutions des pays arabes (Bruylant, 2000); Brown (n 21); Nathan Brown,
‘Constituting Palestine: The Effort of Writing a Basic Law for the Palestinian Authority’ (2000) 54 Middle
East Journal 25–43; Nathan Brown, Palestinian Politics After the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine
(University of California Press, 2003).
27 As a matter of convenience, I will adopt the criteria of the League of Arab States, available at www.arabeague
online.org/las/arabic/categoryList.jsp?level_id=56.
28 See eg the Constitutions of Egypt (Art 3), Bahrain (Art 1/D), Lebanon (Preamble), Somalia (Art 1), Sudan
(Art 2), Syria (Art 2). For more on the Arab Constitutions referred to in this and following footnotes, see
the official page of POGAR (Program on Governance in the Arab Region): www.pogar.org/resources/
listlinks.aspx?lid=13.
29 See eg the Constitutions of Algeria (Art 6), Kuwait (Art 6), Morocco (Art 2), Tunisia (Art 3). 
that adopted written constitutions. While referring often to the people (or the nation)30
as the holder of constituent power,31 the source of all powers,32 constitutions in the Arab
world often state that the people exercise power through their representatives,33 through
referendum,34 through the constitutional institutions,35 or in the way prescribed by the
constitution.36 In some instances, the supremacy or sovereignty of the law,37 or the
constitution,38 is stated expressly. 
One may doubt the relevance of such constitutional provisions for two reasons at
least. First, despite the similarities in constitutional provisions, there is a gap in the Arab
countries between the law of the constitution (as a written text) and the ‘real
constitution’.39 Second, such constitutional provisions do not mean much in the absence
of a democratic system, based on the rule of law. Both objections insinuate that, in order
to know more about the real constitution, there is a need to read the constitutional text
in the light of the way real power is exercised in each and every Arab state. It can thus be
observed that the Arab world may best be described in terms similar to the colourful title
of Nathan Brown’s book (Constitutions in a Non-Constitutional World).40
However, even those who agree with the above two claims cannot deny the simple fact
that those arguments cannot be raised against Arab Constitutions alone. Such a
phenomenon is indeed present in other parts of the world.41 Historically speaking,
‘popular sovereignty’ was often invoked by authoritarian and totalitarian nationalists ‘to
justify their demands for extreme forms of national self-assertion’.42 Most importantly,
even in democracies, the people are often marginalised, and their role is limited to the one
assigned by the constitution itself and by the law in general (often by way of caveats within
the constitution itself). 
This means that the above objections regarding the supposed non-constitutional
nature of constitutionalism in Arab states, while indeed expressing valid concerns, have
only limited relevance for the main point I will defend here, namely that the source of
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30 See eg the Constitution of Jordan. 
31 See eg Constitution of Algeria (Art 7).
32 See eg the Constitutions of Egypt (Art 3), Bahrain (Art 1D), Iraq (Art 5), Jordan (Art 24(i)), Lebanon
(Preamble (d)), Qatar (Art 59), Yemen (Art 4) and the Basic Law of the Palestinian Authority (Art 2). 
33 See eg the Constitutions of Algeria (Art 7), Morocco (Art 2), Somalia (Art 1), Yemen (Art 4).
34 See eg the Constitutions of Algeria (Art 7), Yemen (Art 4). 
35 See eg the Constitutions of Iraq (Art 5), Lebanon (Preamble (d)), Morocco (Art 2), the Palestinian Authority
(Art 2).
36 See eg the Constitutions of Jordan (Art 24(ii)), Kuwait (Art 6), Qatar (Art 59), Sudan (Art 2), Syria (Art 2).
37 See eg the Constitutions of Iraq (Art 5), Morocco (Art 2).
38 See eg the Constitutions of Morocco (Art 2), Sudan (Art 3).
39 See Victor V Ramraj, ‘Constitutional Tipping Points: Sustainable Constitutionalism in Theory and Practice’
(2010) 1(2) Transnational Legal Theory 191–220. 
40 See Nathan Brown, Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World (State University of New York Press, 2002). 
41 See Ramraj (n 39). 
42 Bernard Yack, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism’ (2001) 29 Political Theory 518. 
power in Arab states is neither God nor the Holy Book of any particular religion but
rather a humanly established community that is territorially defined, that reflects the
needs of its time, and that is contingent on immanent needs and will. 
The fact that most Arab states adopt rigid constitutions and refer to the people as the
source of authority, in a way similar to other countries all over the world, proves the
relevance this principle for the legitimacy of Arab states despite the deficiencies in their
democratic records. Most importantly, reference to ‘the people’ is of particular relevance
for territorially defined Arab states, on the one hand, to distinguish themselves from
neighbouring Arab states and peoples even while sharing a sense of belonging to a
borderless Arab nation, and, on the other, to accommodate religious and sectarian
diversities within its borders. Accordingly, despite being absented and marginalised from
the real affairs of the state, the reference to the ‘people’ in constitutional texts is relevant
for contemporary Arab states. It textually means that authority is exercised by human
beings over human beings with the authority of human beings themselves. Most
importantly, it means that authority in contemporary Arab states is, by definition,
exercised by secular, and not divine or transcendental, power. 
IV. ARAB STATES, ARAB NATIONALISM AND ISLAMISM 
Despite the attachment to territorial states, legitimating discourses often go beyond
territorial states to reach Arab nation and Islamic umma. Some have argued that the clear
gap between the discourse and the reality can be explained by the dichotomy between
indigenous political culture and imported elitist culture.43 While such an explanation
should not be underestimated, it is possible nonetheless to go beyond that and suggest that
this gap is the expression of a much deeper problem, namely a problem of identity and
belonging, whether to a specific, territorially defined Arab population, to the Arab nation
or to the Islamic nation. In other words, the gap expresses a dichotomy between a people
that is historically, culturally and largely religiously defined, and a people of a particular
state, legally established. 
1. The Centrality of the ‘State’ 
As outlined above, popular sovereignty as a theoretical principle may be embodied in
most constitutions, but sovereignty of the people, even in democracies, is often only a
principle without legal implications beyond the fact that being under the same law and
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43 See eg Bahgat Korany, ‘Alien and Besieged Yet Here to Stay: The Contradictions of the Arab Territorial State’
in Ghassan Salamé (ed), The Foundations of the Arab State (Croom Helm, 1987) 49.
institutions is what makes them one people—a ‘demos’—in the first place.44 Accordingly,
the people are free to exercise power not directly, but only through their representative
government. They may have a role to play in certain circumstances, but only if the
constitution permits that. Accordingly, the constitution, enacted by the constituent power,
by a sovereign prerogative, frames the way the people, the governed, participate in
deciding their own destiny.45
If it is not the people, then who is the sovereign, and if it is not its prerogative that is
constituent, whose will is embodied in the constitution? What are the criteria for knowing
which forms of government fit the needs of pre-established community, in order to
accommodate the sovereign power in the state? Many answers are theoretically possible.
My suggestion is to consider the particular position the ‘state’ has occupied in modern
societies. In the nineteenth century, indeed, attributing sovereignty to the state resolved
a struggle between those favouring the sovereignty of the monarch and those favouring
popular sovereignty. State sovereignty, as a compromise between both doctrines, gave the
state the central place it occupied, which led to the denomination of Staatsrecht (the law
of the state) in contrast to Verfassungsrecht (constitutional law).46
As a matter of history of discourse, then, it is the state, acquiring a personality, which
is the new sovereign. This State-Sovereign is omnipresent and absolute in that it is no
longer only one of the many forms in which political communities can be shaped. It is the
centrality of the State in all public affairs that characterises modern Arab states,47 and
that distinguishes them—as a matter of degree of omnipresence and absolutism—from
the extent of centrality of the State in some other, notably ‘Western’, states. States’ security,
stability and protection have priority over whatever may be the other objectives in the
legal and political system. The state here is priceless and everything else can be sacrificed.
Although recognised as citizens, the governed are no more than subjects over whom the
state exercises its authority, indiscreetly. The state does not serve other objectives, but the
preservation of itself is the objective. It is absolute and knows no limits whatsoever. What
is more, such states see in the similarly evolving neighbouring Arab states a potential
danger, which only serves to reinforce the statism.48 The result of this evolution is that
Arab states increasingly became entrenched and naturalised as States.49
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44 For Sieyès, for example, the nation is a ‘body of associates living under common laws and represented by
the same legislative assembly’. Ulrich K Preuss, ‘Constitutional Powermaking of the New Polity: Some
Deliberations between the Constituent Power and the Constitution’ in Rosenfeld (n 11) 149, citing
Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, What is the Third Estate? (Pall Mall Press, 1963) 58. 
45 Rosenfeld (n 11) 13. 
46 See Armin Von Bogdandy, ‘The Past and Promise of Doctrinal Constructivism: A Strategy for Responding
to the Challenges Facing Constitutional Scholarship in Europe’ (2009) 7 International Journal of
Constitutional Law 385. 
47 According to Ghalioun, the state found itself at the core of the debate over nationalism. See Burhan
Ghalioun, Le malaise arabe—L’état contre la nation (La Découverte, 1991) 53.
48 See Ghassan Salamé, ‘Introduction’ in Salamé (n 43) 6. 
49 Ibid, 3; Korany (n 43) 72. 
Having the above in mind, one may now understand why Arab states, whose policies
are largely defined by the existing regimes, become suspicious whenever it comes to
transnational movements that go beyond the rhetoric of Arab unity based on the existing
sovereign Arab states. It is possible also to understand why the norm of non-interference
in domestic affairs is primordial in any initiative having an associative character between
Arab states, such as the Arab League.50 It is, finally, possible to understand why Arab states
are suspicious towards double loyalties and dual citizenship involving other Arab states.51
2. Nationalism without the Nation
Nationalism may have rapidly invaded the Arab mentality as much as in many other parts
of the world, giving rise to territorially defined modern states. However, this invasion has
not been met with a clear definition of what exactly the nation is.52 Notwithstanding
preliminary usage in this essay of ‘nation’ and ‘people’ (and popular and national
sovereignty) as interchangeable concepts, the relation between Arab ‘nation’ and single
Arab ‘people’ may actually not be well comprehended using concepts such as ‘nation’
and ‘people’.53 In fact, these two concepts have to be understood in the light of the wider
concept of the umma,54 which is often used to refer to the Islamic community or the
community of believers (al-umma al-Islameyya) and to the Arab nation (al-umma 
al-’arabeyya).55 However, there is no contemporary state that can pretend to incorporate
one or both nations in one political community. What we have right now is a multiplicity
of territorially defined states. 
For Arab nationalists, the (Arab) nation exists as a human group with its own
characteristics, such as language, history and traditions.56 This means that the reference
to Arab nation as cultural heritage does not exclude necessarily support for political unity;
neither is it necessarily exhausted or limited to it. What is clear is that all attempts at
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50 The principle of non-interference in other states’ internal affairs and respect for their sovereignty are
institutionalised in Art 8 of the Charter of the Arab League.
51 See generally Badil, Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2006–2007 (Badil Resource
Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 2007) 126.
52 See Salamé (n 43) 4. 
53 There is no one unique definition of the concepts of nation, people and state. These terms are often treated
as synonymous, while in fact they are not. For more, see Khalil (n 26) 86–87.
54 For an overview of the different meanings of umma, see Said Bensaid, ‘Al-Watan and Al-Umma in
Contemporary Arab Use’ in Salamé (n 43) 150–67. 
55 The use of umma to indicate the Islamic ‘nation’ and ‘Arab nation’ shall not be interpreted as suggesting
that Islamic umma and Arab umma can be used interchangeably; in fact, many Christians are part of the
Arab umma, while many others form part of the Islamic umma, despite them not being Arabs in the first
place. 
56 See Iliya Harik, ‘The Origins of the Arab State System’ in Salamé (n 43) 20. Such a cultural dimension of
the Arab nation does not necessarily contradict current particularities within Arab populations. See
Ghalioun (n 47) 38. 
(political) unity failed, and Arab nationalism started to adapt and accommodate its
ideology with the current Arab territorial states. 
If one admits that a culturally defined (or even ethnically shaped) nation, the Arab
nation, helped in the first instance to justify the revolution of the Arabs, or parts of the
Arab populations, against other Muslims, the Ottomans, how can we distinguish between
Arab populations and the currently established territorial Arab states? What makes the
Jordanian different from the Palestinian, the Lebanese from the Syrian? As a consequence,
adopting the concept of nation as demos is virtually indispensable. A nation is no longer
culturally or religiously defined, but rather holds together all those citizens who are living
under the same law and under the same constitution within a currently existing state.
Attractive as it may seem, the above construction is still not convincing, simply
because individuals do not live in the abstract. They are individuals within a particular
community. They have their religion, their colour of skin, their language. They may share
a common history, experiences, and tragedies. They may have the same origin and
homeland. They may feel, accordingly, affinities with certain groups rather than with
others and these groups may, on the one hand, not necessarily extend throughout a state’s
territory or may, on the other hand, extend across territorial boundaries. This is what can
be referred to as ‘cultural heritage’; it has the advantage of creating bonds that unite
individuals, regardless of—and sometimes despite—the state itself. In this sense,
individuals, although they may be sometimes stateless,57 are always persons within a
community, never purely individuals alone. 
However, like human beings, nations also have their history. Individuals are born and
integrated within that community, often through no choice of their own. A state exists one
day, but it can disappear the next. Once created, however, the state is not the product of
nothing, because ‘nothingness’ simply does not exist. It is always a state of a particular
people who have their own history, language and culture. As Michael Walzer eloquently
puts it: when you ‘bring the people into political life … they arrive marching in tribal
ranks and orders, carrying with them their own language, historical memories, customs,
beliefs, and commitments’.58 Not to forget, of course, that it is precisely this identity that
explains and justifies the march towards independence in the first place. In other words,
it is precisely that distinctiveness from other nations that pushes towards the assertion of
national identity, and may lead to different forms of political self-expression, including
organisation into a new state. 
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57 This is the case right now for most Palestinians. See generally Rema Hammami and Penny Johnson, ‘Equality
with a Difference: Gender and Citizenship in Transitional Palestine’ (1999) Social Politics 316; Abbas Shiblak,
‘Stateless Palestinians’ (2006) 26 Forced Migration Review 8–9; Asem Khalil, Palestinian Nationality and
Citizenship: Current Challenges and Future Perspectives (Research Report 2007/08, European University
Institute 2007) 27–28, 34–35. This was also the case, historically speaking, with other ‘culture nations’ such
as the Polish Nation between 1795 and 1918. See Preuss (n 44) 150. 
58 Quoted in Yack (n 42) 518. 
3. Constitutional Reference to Shari’a
Many Arab countries state in their constitutional texts that Islam is the state religion,59 and
that Shari’a, ‘principles of Shari’a’,60 or Islamic Jurisprudence,61 is a or the source of
legislation.62 Some constitutions require certain governmental offices, such as the office
of President63 or even the King,64 to be held by Muslims. Some constitutions prohibit
Islam from being excluded from the constitution by any future amendment to the
constitution.65 And when constitutional provision is made for equality of women, some
constitutions situate or even condition the principle by reference to Islamic Shari’a.66
The increasing reference to Shari’a in Arab states’ constitutions is perplexing,
especially for those who perceive this phenomenon to be an increasing ‘Islamisation’ of
current Arab states. For them, those are the signs of the creation of an Islamic state,67 or
at least the adoption of an Islamic form of government. If this postulation is correct, I
argue that the reference to Islam appears to be self-contradictory, for at least two reasons.
First, in Islam, nationality cannot separate Muslim believers. An Islamic state does
not accept intra-Muslim borders.68 Most importantly, the Islamic umma is defined not
territorially but rather by the community of believers itself.69 The reference to Islam and
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59 See eg the Constitutions of Algeria (Art 2), Bahrain (Art 2), Egypt (Art 2), Jordan (Art 2), Kuwait (Art 2),
Morocco (Art 6), Tunisia (Art 1), United Arab Emirates (Art 7). Art 4 of the Basic Law of the Palestinian
Authority refers to Islam as the ‘official religion in Palestine’.
60 See eg the Constitution of Egypt (Art 2). 
61 See eg the Constitution of Syria (Art 3(2)). 
62 Examples of references to Shari’a as a source of legislation can be found in the Constitutions of Bahrain (Art
2), Kuwait (Art 2), the United Arab Emirates (Art 7), Syria (Art 3(2)). The Basic Law of the Palestinian
Authority refers in Art 4 to ‘principles of Islamic Shari’a’ and states that they shall be ‘a principal source of
legislation’. The Constitution of Egypt (Art 2) refers to Shari’a as the source of legislation. This article was
originally similar to previous constitutional provisions (referring to Shari’a as a source). Baudouin Dupret,
‘A Return to the Shari’a? Egyptian Judges and the Reference to Islam’ in Nadjma Yassari (ed), The Shari’a
in the Constitutions of Afghanistan, Iran and Egypt—Implications for Private Law (Mohr Siebeck, 2005) 163.
It was amended in 1980 by popular referendum. See Adel Omar Sherif, ‘Constitutions of Arab Countries and
the Position of the Shari’a’ in Yassari, ibid, 158. 
63 See eg the Constitutions of Algeria (Art 73), Syria (Art 3), Tunisia (Art 38). 
64 See eg the Constitutions of Jordan (Art 28(e)), Kuwait (Art 4(5)). 
65 See eg the Constitutions of Algeria (Art 178), Morocco (Art 106). 
66 See eg the Constitution of Egypt (Art 11). 
67 In this paper, a distinction is drawn between an Islamic and a Muslim state, in the way explained by Voll: ‘a
“Muslim state” is a state where the majority of the people are Muslim, while an “Islamic state” would be one
in which there is a formal program of implementation of the regulations and ideals of Islam.’ John O Voll,
‘Islam and Islamic’ in Richard C Martin (ed), Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World (Macmillan
Reference USA, 2004) 360. 
68 As Hasan al-Banna, the spiritual father of the Muslim Brothers, puts it: ‘Islam does not recognize
geographical frontiers and does not take into account racial differences. On the contrary, it considers all
the Muslims as one umma and regards all Muslim countries as one watan, regardless of the distance and
boundaries which separate them.’ Quoted in Bensaid (n 54) 173.
69 See Bensaid (n 54) 171–3. 
Islamic law may be used also to reject the idea of territorially defined states as a whole, and
thus current Arab states.70 The challenge for those who advance such a vision is to justify
their accommodation within territorially defined states, and the way they deal with the
non-Muslim communities, within Arab states, and deal with inter-Muslim differences
(most importantly, between Shiites and Sunnis). 
Second, according to Islamic law sovereignty belongs to God: no state has the right
to exercise authority except in subordination to and in accordance with the Law revealed
by God and his prophet. But, if God is a source of authority, how is it then that we use
positive law to grant certain principles the power of law if their authority is based on
divine origin? 
If the reference to Islam and Shari’a does not per se create an Islamic state, why then
do Arab states refer to Shari’a in their constitutions?71 When redacting their constitutions,
why do the overwhelming majority of Arab states seem to prefer granting such a
primordial place to Shari’a in their constitutions? One of the possible ways to explain this
phenomenon is by reference to cultural and religious particularities of each nation. Some
even argue that the reference to Islam and Shari’a in Arab countries may be a way to
distance the new regime from previous colonising or occupying regimes, and to do so as
part of an assertion of a specific cultural, political and legal identity. Not only may this
be the purpose of the text, but also the constitution-making project as a whole may
subscribe to that same objective.72
In fact, some provisions present in constitutional texts support such a vision of Islam
as ‘cultural heritage’,73 or as ‘moral values’.74 In this sense, they may even be shared by
non-Muslim citizens because, for them, being ‘Islamic’ is no longer something only
religious, but can also be embraced as moral, ethical and cultural values.75 Where this
interpretation is correct, then the different ways in which constitutional texts refer to
Islam and Shari’a is not an issue,76 since the supremacy of the constitution, the guarantees
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70 Olivier Roy makes an important distinction that needs to be duly considered, namely between Islamic
movements, increasingly nationalised, and radicalism, which is by definition de-territorialised. Olivier Roy,
‘Islamisme et nationalism’ (2003) 104 Pouvoirs 53. 
71 Note that my concern here goes beyond the explanation of why certain provisions have been included and
why certain formulations were preferred instead of others. Rather, the question I raise is related to the
reasons behind the reference itself, whatever form it takes.
72 Sherif (n 62) 159.
73 See eg the Constitution of Bahrain (Art 6). 
74 See eg the Constitution of Algeria (Art 9). 
75 See Jonathan Brockopp, ‘Shari’a’ in Martin (n 67) 619. 
76 The fact that most constitutional texts refer to Shari’a as a source for legislation, not as source of law,
supports this interpretation of Islam as cultural heritage. In fact, in civil law issues, it is possible in many Arab
countries to refer to Shari’a expressly as an auxiliary source of law. This is the case in Egypt, for example.
The Egyptian Civil Code of 1949 stipulates (at Art 875) that ‘in the absence of an applicable legal provision’
the judge has competence to give a ruling according to custom, and, in its absence, according to the principles
of Shari’a. See Dupret (n 62) 163. But even in this case, it is the judge who will decide which principle of
Shari’a to apply in the specific case, in the absence of legal provision, and even custom.
of equal treatment of citizens, and the normative character of statute law are not shackled
by such constitutional reference to Islam and Shari’a.77
I have argued elsewhere78 that the reference to Islam and Shari’a in a constitutional
text does not per se create an Islamic state.79 It may simply mean that, even in a secular
state, religion may not be totally absent from public affairs. Accordingly, the reference to
Islam in the constitution should not create any unnecessary perplexity. Such
interpretation of the constitutional reference to Islam and Shari’a is more concerned with
constitutional mechanisms aimed at protecting individuals’ and minorities’ rights.
According to this interpretation, the fact that constitutions refer to Islam means that
Shari’a is confined to the remit of positive law, as expressed in a legislative text issued by
state authorities. 
In other words, the binding character of Shari’a in the above sense is nothing other
than the free will of human authority. The empowerment of Shari’a, through the
constitutional texts, means that a ‘secular will’, not a ‘divine will’, is at the origin of its legal
character. Accordingly, it is in light of the notion that ‘sovereignty is for the people’, a
formulation found in the constitutions of most Arab states, that the recognition of Islam
as the state religion and of Shari’a as the ‘source of legislation’ needs to be interpreted.80
This is particularly true in the absence of a single religious authority competent to
determine what is part of Shari’a and what is not. Accordingly, state organs are given this
task, in accordance with the constitution itself.81
In this regard, countries that have established the institution of ‘judicial review’ will
give the judiciary an important role in this task. This does not mean, however, that any
constitutional provision will be just fine. Indeed, the current formulations (related to
Islam and Shari’a) are open to many interpretations, which can and may be
discriminatory towards citizens who do not share the same religious faith.82 Most
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77 While reviewing various rulings of Egyptian judges, Dupret reached a similar conclusion. Dupret (n 62) 165. 
78 See Asem Khalil, ‘Constitution-Making and State-Building: Redefining the Palestinian Nation’ in Rainer
Grote and Tilmann Röder (eds), Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity
(Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
79 For more on the necessary pillars to establish an Islamic State, see generally Fahmi Jadaane, ‘Notions of the
State in Contemporary Arab-Islamic Writings’ in Salamé (n 43) 132–9. 
80 Sherif (n 62) 158–9. 
81 In Egypt, for example, this process of accommodating Shari’a within the Egyptian legal system is done
under the final scrutiny of the Supreme Constitutional Court. In Algeria, the Constitution, while it
establishes a Constitutional Council, also creates a Supreme Islamic Council, related to the President, with
the task of providing opinions with regard to religious precepts (Arts 171–3). Similarly, in Egypt, the ‘public
management of [Islam as religion of state] is the duty of the Shaykh of al-azhar, of the Muftī of the Republic’.
Dupret (n 62) 162 (emphasis omitted). 
82 Most Arab Constitutions, in fact, refer to freedom of conscience, worship, or religious practice. This is the
case with the Constitutions of Algeria (Art 53), Bahrain (Art 22), Egypt (Art 46), Emirates (Art 32), Jordan
(Art 14), Kuwait (Art 35), Morocco (Art 6), Syria (Art 35), Tunisia (Art 5), Palestinian Authority (Art 4).
However, they limit this freedom to existing monotheistic religions or ‘recognised’ religions, and subordinate
it—as much as many other freedoms—to largely non-defined ‘public order’ or other conditions. 
importantly, judges may refer to Shari’a to justify their judgments, ending up by
consecrating a single, unique public morality, one that does not contradict Shari’a (or
the judge’s understanding of what Shari’a is)83 even if in doing so individuals’ free choice
and liberties are violated (for Muslims and non-Muslims alike).84
V. THE UNIVERSAL VERSUS THE PARTICULAR
The argument of ‘cultural heritage’ and the argument related to Islam as ‘religion of the
majority’ is an attractive explanation for the reference to Islam and Shari’a. In most Arab
constitutions, however, the people did not participate in the process of constitution-
making. As was noted earlier, it is often the regimes in power that constitute the
constitutions, not the other way around. Why it is then attractive, for Arab regimes, to
refer to Islam and Shari’a? The reasons behind this phenomenon—that some may refer
to as a ‘return to Islam’85 or ‘return to Shari’a’86 or even ‘Islamic resurgence’87—go beyond
the scope of this paper. I suspect, however, that the insistence on conformity of the state
with Islam increases with the decline of alternative legitimating narratives; in such
conditions, respect for God’s law (Shari’a) within potentially many others, depending on
the country, is deemed a sufficient ground for obedience by constituencies for whom
other legitimating narratives are not persuasive, tied as it is to the aim of perpetuating the
Islamic umma88 and avoiding fitna (discord amongst Muslims).89
In other words, Islam and Shari’a are only narratives that current regimes use to justify
their authority.90 They use religion as much as they use other values or principles, such
as equality, rights and freedoms. They endorse democracy and subscribe to a government
limited by law. The only way to give a coherent narrative of such diversity of constitutional
provisions is to accept their being directed towards different constituencies, whether on
the local, regional or international level. 
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83 While doing so, the judge presents his ruling as ethically, socially and historically based. As pointed out by
Dupret: ‘A rule exists as the inclusion of an understanding that we feel in harmony with others.’ Dupret
(n 62) 157. 
84 The variety of cases in which a judge can refer to Shari’a is interesting: it may extend to various domains
and fields. In Egypt, for example, this occurred in cases related to wearing veils in public schools, refusing
the title of professor, attacking Islam and saying heretical things, and authorising sex change operations. See
Dupret (n 62) 172–8.
85 The ‘return to Shari’a’ is being used rhetorically, even among Muslim intellectuals, focusing primarily on
issues of public dress and ritual conduct, but also invoking the idea of Shari’a as a total way of life. See
Brockopp (n 75) 618. 
86 See Dupret (n 62) 59.
87 See Voll (n 67) 360. 
88 For a discussion, see generally PJ Vatikiotis, Islam and the State (Croom Helm, 1987) 34.
89 Bernard Botiveau, ‘Contemporary Reinterpretations of Islamic Law: The Case of Egypt’ in Chibli Mallat
(ed), Islam and Public Law (Graham & Trotman, 1993) 261. 
90 See eg Sherif (n 62) 159. 
One thing is certain, however. In contemporary Arab states, the relationship between
religion and state is becoming increasingly problematic. In fact, the advantage of Shari’a
is that one can invoke it to support anything one wants. The disadvantage is that
everybody understands that.91 Reference to Islam or to Shari’a is often used, not to
support current regimes, but to call for rebellion against them.92 For many Islamist
groups, the current Arab states are not Islamic at all, or, at least, not enough. Furthermore,
given the current map of Arab and Muslim states, which are territorially defined, it is
perhaps more correct to say that, for some fundamentalist groups, those Arab states can
never be Islamic enough. Islamic radicalism, for example, denounces the almost forgotten
Islamic Shari’a,93 despite references to Islam and to Shari’a in constitutional texts. 
For many Islamist groups, the undemocratic character of the state is not related to
Islam or to culture.94 Rather, it is used by current regimes to obstruct the democratic
popular will95 and to suppress freedoms.96 Islamists who are willing to participate in the
political process are treated differently by Arab countries (which must first recognise
political participation of all citizens and reject monopartism—which is not always the
case): they can be allowed (but largely contained),97 banned,98 or even forced into exile.99
In certain cases, elections in which ‘Islamists’ or pro-Islamists win elections are
cancelled,100 or may result in international condemnation and boycott.101 It is the rise of
Islamist movements that has become ‘a matter of great concern for secular Arabs and
Western governments, who are suspicious of their ultimate goals’.102
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91 I borrow the colourful critique of John Hart Ely against Natural Law (cited in Stephen M Feldman, ‘An
Interpretation of Max Weber’s Theory of Law: Metaphysics, Economics, and the Iron Cage of Constitutional
Law’ (1991) 16 Law and Social Inquiry 237) to make a parallel critique of the possible reference to Shari’a
in modern Arab states, where Shari’a is conceived as a standard that determines the binding character of
(state-positive) law (such that Shari’a in a sense plays the role of that standard which effectively determines
whether a positive law is actually law). 
92 See Harik (n 56) 20.
93 See Botiveau (n 89) 262.
94 See Bensaid (n 54) 169–70. This is not to argue that there were not also, within the Islamic movement, some
strong voices against ‘democracy’ as a Western, and hence ‘bad’, product. See the discussion in Chibli Mallat,
‘On the Specificity of Middle Eastern Constitutionalism’ (2006) 38 Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law 44. 
95 See generally Dale F Eickelman, ‘Changing Perceptions of State Authority: Morocco, Egypt and Oman’ in
Salamé (n 43) 200. 
96 See Bensaid (n 54) 168. 
97 This is the case in Morocco and Jordan. Nathan Brown, Amr Hamzawy and Marina Ottaway, ‘Islamist
Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones’ (2007) 67 Middle East
Series: Carnegie Papers 5. 
98 This is still the case in Egypt. See ibid. 
99 This is the case in Algeria, Tunisia and Syria. See ibid, 5, 7.
100 This is what happened when Islamists were victorious in the 1991 Algerian elections. See ibid, 17. 
101 This is the case with Hamas (in the Occupied Palestinian Territory) and Hizbollah (in Lebanon), each of
which turned to the ballot box. See ibid, 12. 
102 Ibid, 5.
Others take a different path, trying to show how the system of government, which has
been established since early Islam, is by definition ‘constitutional’ or ‘constitutionalist’,
in that the normative content of Shari’a played a limiting role in terms of governmental
power. This is why it is possible even to talk about ‘Islamic Constitutionalism’.103 For
Sherif, ‘adherence to Islamic law is important to our ability to limit the powers of the
government. No man or governing body should retain absolute power. A strong
constitution based on Islamic norms ensures that they will not.’104 In a sense, Islamic
constitutionalism has something in common with liberal ‘constitutionalism’: a limited
government. 
It is true that, contrary to other concepts, such as the Rule of Law (translatable as
hukm al-qanun) or Etat de droit/Rechtsstaat (translatable as dawlat al-qanun), there are no
terms equivalent to ‘constitutionalism’ in Arabic.105 Especially as a terminological gap is
not exclusively the case of Arabic language and culture,106 the absence of an equivalent
terminology ‘need not mean that Arab-Islamic political thought does not know what
constitutionalism means, or that it is conceptually unequipped to deal with the issues
that constitutionalism addresses. On the contrary, a concern with ruling in accordance
with the law, the people’s right to oppose unjust rule, liberties which rulers are not
permitted to infringe, have existed in Arab-Islamic political thought since the earliest
times.’107
According to this interpretation, constitutionalism as such does not contradict Arab
and Islamic legal culture and their philosophical foundations.108 It is not constitutional-
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103 See generally Saïd Amir Arjomand, ‘Islamic Constitutionalism’ (2007) 3 Annual Review of Law and Social
Science 115; Larry Catá Backer, ‘Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New Global Legal
Ordering (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 85; Intisar A Rabb, ‘“We the Jurists”: Islamic
Constitutionalism in Iraq’ (2008) 10 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 527; Nathan
Brown, ‘Islamic Constitutionalism in Theory and Practice’ in Eugene Cortan and Adel Omar Sherif (eds),
Democracy, the Rule of Law and Islam (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 491; Nadirsyah Hosen, ‘In Search
of Islamic Constitutionalism’ (2004) 21 American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 1; Donna E Arzt, ‘The
Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States’ (1990) 12 Human Rights Quarterly 202;
Mark Gould, ‘Islam, the Law, and the Sovereignty of God’ (2008) 149 Policy Review 3; Azizah Y al-Hibri,
‘Islamic Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy’ (1992) 24 Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law 1; Raja Bahlul, ‘Is Constitutionalism Compatible with Islam?’ in Pietro Costa and Danilo
Zolo (eds), The Rule of Law: History, Theory and Criticism (Springer, 2007) 515; Haider Ala Hamoudi,
‘Dream Palaces of Law: Western Constructions of the Muslim Legal World’ (2009) 32 Hastings International
and Comparative Law Review 803.
104 Sherif (n 62) 159.
105 See Bahlul (n 103) 515.
106 This is also the case in Japan, for example, where the concept of constitutionalism is unknown, according
to Yasuo Hasebe: ‘Constitutional Borrowing and Political Theory’ (2003) 1 International Journal of
Constitutional Law 240.
107 See Bahlul (n 103) 515. 
108 In an earlier study, I exposed how Arabic and Islamic philosophies (such as those that can be traced in Ibn
Khaldun and Al-Farabi) may subscribe easily to what is now called constitutionalism. See Khalil (n 26) 
148–57; Asem Khalil, ‘The Enactment of Constituent Power in the Arab World’ (2006) Ancilla Iuris 95–97.
ism as limited government that is problematic; on the contrary, limiting the government
by reference to a superior normative order that goes beyond the state is completely
coherent with Arab and Islamic culture. The reference to Islam and Shari’a in most
constitutions of Arab states can thus be cited as an example of Arab states subscribing to
the principle of ‘limited government’. 
The disturbing issue in modern constitutionalism is that it goes beyond the ‘limited
government’. It includes two other elements: adherence to the rule of law and the
protection of human rights. The problem with these two elements, as part of that
normative order limiting the government, is that they may (and effectively they often do)
compete with other normative orders in Arab states. A clash may occur when certain
rights are violated, based on that normative (largely religious, but also historically and
culturally contingent) framework, which framework is very generically labelled as Shari’a
despite the differences in normative content from state to state. 
Here I am taking it as given that ‘equality is inextricably linked to modern
constitutionalism’,109 such that it is impossible to perceive (modern) constitutionalism
without it.110 It is by virtue of this equality component that constitutionalism becomes
not a limitation on democracy, but rather its enhancement, accomplishment and
realisation. What if equality norms clash with other normative orders? Scholars often
make reference to two cases, deemed to be of real concern to individuals living in many
Arab and Islamic countries: religious minorities and women.111
To justify and add normative support for the protection of minorities and women,
reference is often made to human rights as defined by international law. They are
perceived to be universal, not dependent on (cultural, social, historical or religious)
contingencies of each state. But, what if certain interpretations of Shari’a are used to
discriminate against religious minorities, or against women? What if Shari’a is defined and
interpreted in a way that fundamentally contradicts religious freedom and women’s
rights? Asking such questions does not require that we argue that Shari’a is effectively
contradicting religious minorities’ and women’s rights in a given context,112 let alone
that it necessarily must do so; rather, the issue is ‘what if?’. In such situations, what would
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109 Rosenfeld (n 11) 8. 
110 For more on the place of equality in modern constitutionalism, see generally Maurizio Fioravanti, ‘Chapter
7: Constitutionalism’ in Damiano Canale, Paolo Grossi and Hasso Hofmann (eds), A Treatise of Legal
Philosophy and General Jurisprudence (Springer, 2009) 263. 
111 This explains why many Arab states deposited reservations to many international conventions relating to
human rights, especially with regard to articles on freedom of thought and women’s rights. These
reservations often came with express reference to Shari’a. See eg reservations expressed by many Arab
countries that ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(1979), available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=
4&lang=en#2. 
112 Some argue that it has been so historically. See eg Anver Emon, ‘The Limits of Constitutionalism in the
Muslim World: History and Identity in Islamic Law’ in Sujit Choudhry (ed), Constitutional Design for
Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? (Oxford University Press, 2008) 258. 
be the normative framework that is limiting the government when there are these
conflicting normative frameworks?113
The discussion here may lead us to another, a discussion which has reached almost
classical status in international law and human rights law, that of what is universal and
what is particular.114 In constitutional theory, the discussion would be different too, the
issue becoming not whether we need constitutionalism (there is general agreement that
we do), but rather which ‘constitutionalism’ (Western, Islamic, or Asian? Liberal, social,
or socialist?). 
Here, by asking which particular normative perspective should govern, consti-
tutionalism is not perceived as universally shared principles; instead, it is filtered through
one or more particularisms—not only a culturally, ethnically and religiously defined
principle or set of principles, but also philosophical or ethical sets of principles. In all
cases, while premises and conclusions may be expressed as universals within the system’s
own presuppositions, there is simultaneously an awareness of the social or empirical fact
that the systemic perspective itself is controversial and not universally accepted as the
most justifiable perspective in all contexts. 
The advantage of this way of perceiving constitutionalism is that it allows us to agree
on constitutionalism. The disadvantage is that the content of agreement is disagreement
itself, rendering constitutionalism in reality void of the content and sense that justifies the
interest shown in constitutional theory for constitutionalism and its attractiveness as a
normative order. 
VI. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NATIONAL IDENTITY 
It is undeniable that, for a constitutional form to be sustainable, it needs to reflect its
cultural heritage,115 and for a ‘constitutional order’ to work, it ‘must revolve around a
440 Transnational Legal Theory
113 Some scholars have gone further to express scepticism about even the possibility of accommodating
‘constitutionalism’ in the Muslim world. See eg Emon, ibid, who considers the cases of Egypt and Saudi
Arabia regarding religious freedom. 
114 See generally Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Can Human Rights Bridge the Gap between Universalism and Cultural
Relativism? A Pluralist Assessment Based on the Rights of Minorities’ (1999) 30 Columbia Human Rights
Law Review 249; Elisabeth Reichert, ‘Human Rights: An Examination of Universalism and Cultural
Relativism’ (2006) 22 Journal of Comparative Social Welfare 23; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, ‘Cultural Particularism
as a Bar to Women’s Rights: Reflections on the Middle Eastern Experience’ in Julie Stone Peters and Andrea
Wolper (eds), Women’s Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives (Routledge, 1995) 176. 
115 This seems similar to what Montesquieu meant when he observed that ‘the political and civil laws of each
nation … should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is very unlikely that the
laws of one nation can suit another’. Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws
(Cambridge University Press, 1989) 8, quoted in Mark Tushnet, ‘The Possibilities of Comparative
Constitutional Law’ (1999) 108 Law Yale Law Journal 1265. For Hegel, too, a constitution is ‘the work of
centuries … the consciousness of rationality so far as that consciousness is developed in a particular nation’.
predominant identity’.116 Constituent power, accordingly, cannot be neutral to the
particularities of each community, and thus the resulting constitution also needs to relate
to this cultural heritage. A people in this sense are a nation with a particular cultural
heritage (ie people as ethnos as distinct from people as demos).117
The concept of nation determines the idea of state, and its relation to individuals and
the society in general. It has, most importantly, serious consequences for the way
‘constituent power’ is perceived, exercised and expressed. Here, two new questions arise.
First, can a constitution be regarded as legitimate only if it reflects a pre-constitutional
shared identity (which in turn is connected to a cultural heritage, or culture), or can the
making of the constitution itself be tantamount to the construction of ‘the people’? The
answer to this question appears simple, since both cases are theoretically possible. In
practice it will depend on the concerned country and the particular context in which the
constitution is enacted.118
The second question is, then, to know if there is any connection between the
constitution and the group with a pre-established identity, the people (as ethnos), which
is prior to the state itself. To answer the second question, different options may be
considered.
The first possibility is that there is no connection at all between the two.119 This is the
position of Hans Kelsen.120 With his legal positivism, he resolves the paradox of what can
be termed the question of ‘constitutional legitimacy’ (ie legitimately adopted consti-
tutions) by separating the legal from the political. This solution is simple, attractive and
coherent, but it is still unsatisfactory.121 Kelsen indeed resolves the problem by negating
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it, by stating that it is not a legal issue, and that it is outside a juridical field. As noted by
his rival, Carl Schmitt, this radical distinction between the political and the legal prevented
Kelsen from providing a satisfying account of the political dynamics of constitution-
making.122
Second, there is the possibility of a direct connection between the constitution and
the people. How? There are different ways of perceiving this connection.123 The first way
is by identifying the ‘We the People’ only through the making of the constitution itself.
In a sense, the essence of a people is in their being represented and explicated in a
particular form by the process of constitution-making itself. The second way of perceiving
the relationship between the people and the constitution is that both pursue unity
simultaneously in a gradual and incremental manner. In a sense, both the constitution and
the nation are related by the common future, which may one day—but not necessarily—
be a present. In such a context, a state (that is, processes established and overseen by the
state) has the primordial role in shaping both the constitution and the nation. Finally, we
can perceive the connection not as if the constitution creates the collectivity but as if it
mirrors a pre-political unity,124 while recognising the pre-constitutional exercise of a
homogeneous nation’s general will. 
Constitutions, accordingly, are legitimate as far as they map onto the nation (whether
invented by it, developed side by side with it, or even reflected in it). The ‘nation’ or the
‘people’, whether conceptualised as an authoring entity (the nation or the people, for the
French post-Revolution statesmen)125 or as a plurality (as conceived by the founders of
the American nation),126 is the author of the constitution. It is the creator of its consti-
tutional order. 
The problem in the above argument is that one may go further in challenging the
criteria by which one can determine the identity of that ‘people’, and how they acquire
their distinctive character as a single entity. Some constitutional theorists have embraced
a circular answer to this question:
Duncan Ivison, for example, has argued that the ‘[c]onstitution constitutes the People who in
turn constitute it’. In a similar vein, in the context of European integration, Joseph Weiler has
observed that ‘[i]n many instances, constitutional doctrine presupposes the existence of that
which it creates: the demos which is called upon to accept the constitution is constituted, legally,
by that very constitution …127
442 Transnational Legal Theory
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 In a sense, we resolve the problem of the authorship of the constitution by making reference to an imagined
pre-political person (a thicker, historical people, this time ethnically conceived) that creates its own polity.
See Oklopcic (n 118) 358. 
125 See Hasebe (n 106) 227–8. 
126 As pointed out by Hannah Arendt, ‘[t]he word “people” retained for [founders] the meaning of manyness,
of the endless variety of a multitude whose majesty resided in its very plurality’. Hannah Arendt, On
Revolution (Penguin, 2006) 83.
127 Quoted in Oklopcic (n 118) 358. 
Another way out of this dilemma is to explain the identity of the people by reference to
theories from outside the juridical field, such as those of ‘social contract’. There are indeed
different approaches to social contract. Venter distinguishes at least three: (1) the British
approach—which did not need a written constitution—emphasises the political self-
government of society through parliament; (2) the French approach—which had few
scruples in replacing its constitutions—emphasises the nation as it is manifested in the
state; and (3) the American social contract approach reflects the American concern with
a society consisting of a multitude of individuals whose mutual contract is contained in
the Supreme Constitution.128 Such theories, with high degrees of articulation within
corresponding political theory, try to explain the beginning of polities.129 Theories of
‘social contract’ at the origin of states’ constitutions, whether this contract is a real
historical event or an imagined one, provide an interesting account. 
Without underestimating the relevance of questioning the identity of the people, by
looking backward to remote origins, we should rather ask ourselves a completely different
question: What should we do with those who do not share the same cultural heritage of
the nation? Can the state use those differences to justify discrimination against them?
Such an attitude is dangerous, especially in contemporary states which are characterised
by multiplicity in terms not only of cultures, languages and ethnicities, but also of
‘nations’ that live within the same borders, as citizens of the same state.
The constitution, alternatively, may provide a tool for creating this common element
needed for the cohesion of people of contemporary states. It serves to make all constituent
groups and individuals feel that the state is their own. They may not share a common
cultural heritage in the present; it is possible that they did not share a cultural heritage in
the past; most importantly, they may not even be requested to do so in the future. Despite
all this, they still identify themselves with that document, the constitution, in order to
preserve the unity of the people and the cohesion of the state. In other words, the
importance of the constitution lies not in its expression of pre-established political
identity, but in the constitution’s ability to transform such identity into a civic one.
According to Preuss, ‘[t]he constituent power is simultaneously the creator of the
constitution and the permanent threat to it. Yet, both functions are necessary for the
vitality of the constitution’.130 Accordingly, ‘[w]hat matters is not the pre-constitutional
shared—or unshared—identity, but the new political identity based on the constitution
itself’.131 As pointed out by Preuss, ‘[t]he constitution, although created by the constituent
power, must always fight against the tendency of its own creator to infuse pre-political
elements into the structures of politics’.132 In a sense, ‘[t]he constitution gives birth to the
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people in the sense in which this notion has been developed for the concept of democracy
that is in the sense of the demos’.133
Admitting the existence of a people as demos is not the end of story. The remaining
problem is to understand whether, and within what limits, the will of the nation shall be
applied by the state and reflected in the constitution. Is it sufficient that a nation wants
something for this will to be considered good? The problem for those who accept this
option is that the guiding political will loses rationality.134 Constitutionalism, on the
contrary, makes it possible to find legitimating sources of the constitution outside national
preferences. It allows human beings to regain control of their destiny,135 but this time
against possible societal dynamics, often out of rational control. Such dynamics may
develop throughout history, serving the interests of particular groups at the expense of
the demise of the interests of others. 
VII. RELOCATING THE DISCUSSION 
OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
In previous sections I showed that the paradox of modern constitutionalism is not in
having a limited government (as constituted powers), nor a limited people (as demos), but
rather a limited constituent power, ie imposing legal limits on the sovereign to will as it
likes. It is this re-introduction of the sovereign, whoever and whatever it is, in the domain
of legality that constitutes a paradox. Although it may appear a contradiction (how is it
possible to introduce the sovereign to the restraints of the law without losing their
character as sovereign?), the argument I will defend in this section is that, in order to
understand modern constitutionalism, in which human rights and equality are
indispensable pillars, there is a need to discuss the issue from the perspective of the theory
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of state, not from the perspective of the cultural or religious particularity of each nation.
Such a theory needs to be read in light of the new realities in which contemporary states
exist. 
The new realities to which I am referring are those that resulted from the atrocities
of the Second World War and the subsequent changes in international law and domestic
laws. In my narration, modern constitutionalism, in which the protection of human rights
is an essential component, is not primarily the product of the late nineteenth century, or
the post-Soviet Union, but rather of the post-Second World War period. States whose
officials and citizens witnessed the atrocities of gross violations of human rights during
the Second World War seem to be saying, through modern constitutionalism: ‘never
again’. Modern constitutionalism is nothing more than that normative order that makes
‘never again’ a legal reality in domestic legal systems. For that reason, the development of
modern constitutionalism, in which the protection of human rights is an essential
component, is not Western, but universal by definition. 
It is true that the world system as much as domestic law systems remained largely
state-centred. However, the state is no longer the same.136 The state, the sovereign, is no
longer outside legal constraints. The sovereign, in other words, is re-introduced into the
domain of legality, where both international law and domestic laws are largely codified
in a constitution with constitutional mechanisms to ensure that the sovereign itself acts
legally, with the state no longer being the only and absolute authority to determine what
is legal and what is illegal.137
In such a context, existing states and international organisations become central
actors in the process of constitution-making for new states or for new regimes within
existing states. This phenomenon—that some called ‘internationalization of the
constituent power’138—indicates that the supreme and sovereign act of constitution-
making (constituent power) is no longer a domestic issue only.139 The examples of ‘the
internationalization of the constituent power’ are multiple.140 In the Arab world, this was
the case in Iraq,141 and largely the case with the Palestinian Authority after Oslo in its
efforts to create a Basic Law and a Draft Constitution for the State.142
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Many explanations are given for this phenomenon: the evolution of international law
and international society and the relations between states altered the notion of
sovereignty.143 It is also related to the increasing number of states and the fact that the
formation of many of them followed a conflict situation. In such a context, the
constitution is often connected to a peace treaty between new neighbours, through which
one can formalise a modus vivendi for various ethnic, national, religious and linguistic
groups that are ‘condemned’ to live in the same state.
The involvement of international organisations and foreign countries is clear in the
constitution-making process of newborn states, or of existent states whose constitutional
structures are substantially revised following a change in the regime. However, it goes
beyond the simple transplant, borrowing or imposition of constitutional texts or
institutions. Similar experiences indeed took place even before the Second World War
and were not limited to constitutional texts. Rather, the involvement of the international
community now reflects the tendency to prioritise one form of government over others,
a system in which the individual human being, entitled to inalienable rights, occupies a
central place in that system. As pointed out by Ackerman, ‘the whole world seems to be
designing constitutional machines to check and balance power in the name of human
rights’.144
The fact of individuals as holders of rights that in some sense go beyond the state
shapes the constitutional form, although that form is in other core respects still largely
state-centred. In such a context, constitutional forms acquire new meaning, in which both
constituent and constituted powers are limited by something else that goes beyond them,
exists before them, and may take a form outside both of them. The human being—his
security, stability, development and prosperity—acquires the place originally reserved for
the sovereign. In such a context, the state is no longer perceived as the absolute authority
but rather serves the objective of the welfare of human beings.
Despite the fact that popular involvement—if any—is often marginalised to the
moment of adoption or endorsement of the constitution in toto, including the political
and economic system it represents, constitution-makers often maintain the reference to
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the ‘We the People’. While such reference does not go beyond being a ‘legal fiction’, it is
a necessary one, necessary to close the circle in the democratic account of constitution and
law-making in a particular polity. This legal fiction is necessary to resolve the question of
the legitimacy of those constitutions. The international constituency continues to refer to
the people and the nation in the text that is drafted and proposed for consideration and
adoption.145 The problem here is that it is no longer a self-constitution, in the way the
American and French Revolutions may have suggested. Instead, it is the constitution of
a pseudo-self, completely detached from the collective that gave rise to this process in the
first place. This distorted self-constitution may or may not reflect a past that may or may
not ever have been a present; however, the central point is that it is largely directed towards
the future that, at least as a theoretical possibility, may never be a present.146
The above analysis has the advantage of resolving the paradox, finally, in favour of the
individual human being, without discrimination based on sex, nationality, religion or
ethnicity. This common human belonging that is present in all mankind inevitably pushes
some to reject particularism and support universalism. This centrality of the human being
pushes towards one specific form of government. In such perspective, plurality is
perceived as dangerous because it enhances differences rather than common elements,
different values rather than shared ones, different solutions rather than common ones. We
live in a globalised world;147 thus, we live in the era of globalised constitutions.148 In such
a context, the similarity between constitutions is striking. It is however misleading, and
is largely the result of the way constitutions in the new era of constitutionalism are
drafted.149
The process described above as something that occurred following the Second World
War is not without negative aspects. This international interference in the domestic affairs
of states may end up suffocating local aspirations. The way constitutions are drafted and
imposed sometimes proves that one can confuse the need for written constitutions and
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limited government with the imposition of a particular constitutional model: the liberal
one. Rich countries, for example, may use their foreign and cooperation policy to seek or
pressurise newborn and weak states to adhere to such a model. The risk here is of
suffocation of the local population, their particularities and their culture. This may have
a boomerang effect, with negative consequences on the efficiency of the constitutional
text, since the constitution may be considered an ‘outside product’. Here is another
problem constitutional theory needs to deal with: the substitution of the national
constituency by an international one. The marginalisation of the concerned people or
nation, entitled, theoretically, to constituent power, leads to the creation of a
heteronymous constitution, an imposed constitution rather than a voluntarily adopted
one, which leaves a question of legitimacy of such enactments.150
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The constitutions of many Arab states are evolving; their political and legal systems are
in a continuous state of flux. This includes the way in which their identity is evolving
increasingly around their territorially defined state. Contemporary Arab states are
political rather than religious entities; their authority is, by definition, connected to their
people, largely as defined by state positive law. Arab states are also interested in written
constitutions and, most importantly, are attracted to constitutionalism. Both, indeed,
provide a valid legitimating tool in the community of nations. 
Regardless of whether human rights, rule of law and democracy are compatible with
Islamic law or Arab culture, or whether the argument of cultural and religious
particularity is simply presented by existing regimes to justify the lack of democracy and
deficiencies in their human rights protection record, the issue at stake is to determine
what is universally valid and what can be culturally and locally contingent. In my account,
the development towards more protection of human rights favours of course the thesis
of universality. The way in which this protection is effected, and on what normative basis,
is irrelevant as such. It can be international law or constitutional law, but it can also be via
a religious normative order. 
In case of contradiction between those normative orders (international and
constitutional law on the one side, and religious law on the other), and given the
impossibility of determining in a definitive way what makes up part of that religious
normative order, it is for state authorities (again, secular not religious authorities) to make
a choice. In fact, when an Arab state opts for the religious normative order, it does not
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make reference to a unique and commonly shared normative order, rather it is the state
itself that defines and shapes that normative order. In this sense, I discussed the issue of
Shari’a as being confined to the remit of positive law. The issue, in my account, is not
whether or not Arab states should conform to Shari’a, as a normative order, but whether
or not the state, as a sovereign, can be re-introduced within the domain of legality and
whether state-positive law can be subordinated to a normative order that goes beyond
the positive law. 
In this paper I argued that this could be the case. There are enough reasons to believe
that it is also convenient for Arab states to make this choice. In fact, many Arab states are
subject to internal and external pressures and their stability as states is at stake. One way
out (and maybe the only one available) is to evolve towards a system that endorse pillars
of constitutionalism, where legitimacy depends, not on the way a state or a regime is
established, but on the way government is exercised. 
Territorial Arab states may have dubious origins, but they have the opportunity to
forge a much more legitimate future; their identity will depend largely not on what they
were, but on what they want to be. Within such an identity, no one is excluded a priori,
and no one has a monopoly over the identity itself. A political system that incorporates
such a vision is open to all individuals (regardless of their sex, religion, ethnicity or other
identity-salient status) and to all parties, whether nationalist, Islamist or transnational, on
the condition that there is agreement over the need to maintain the basis of the political
process itself; that political process is, in the first place, what gave them—individuals and
parties alike—the opportunity to exist and to expose their needs, their views and their
wishes to the public, not as mere private concerns but as public ones. 
If the rejection of constitutionalism, as limited government, is the result of the
reticence of existing regimes, unwilling to realise a transition to democracy, resistance to
modern constitutionalism, as a normative order in which human rights are an integral
part, goes beyond the totalitarian regimes. It is indeed often the case that national,
religious, historical or cultural particularities are used as narratives to discredit modern
constitutionalism, which is as considered essentially ‘Western’ and not adapted for other
cultures, such as the Arab-Islamic cultures. 
The question is, then, how can modern constitutionalism be attractive for an Arab
state, if and when such a normative order clashes with religious and moral precepts of its
population? Most challenging for such a choice to embrace modern constitutionalism is
the fact that most Arab constitutions refer to Shari’a and Islam, thus giving it a kind of
supremacy entrenched by the same canonical constitution. If, then, constitutionalism
entails the subordination of the government to a superior normative order and if such
order is specifically entrenched in a written constitution, must this not lead inevitably to
the rejection of any other competing normative orders? Is it not in the name of
constitutionalism that modern constitutionalism can be rejected? In other words, modern
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constitutionalism appears to be contradicting and competing with other available
normative orders, within the same legal system. 
Nothing in what I advanced in this paper argues that modern constitutionalism
necessarily contradicts a particular religion, morality or culture. At the same time, it does
not exclude the possibility that modern constitutionalism may compete with the
(potentially multitudinous) existing normative orders that may exist within the same
legal system. On the contrary, there are serious grounds to believe that it is often the case,
not only in Islamic and Arab countries, but also in Asian countries and indeed in Western
countries. 
What this paper challenged is the general rejection of modern constitutionalism based
on the historical, religious and cultural particularities of each state. It is true that most
prevalent (ie broadly ‘liberal’) concepts and principles related to modern states,
territorially defined, have largely been formulated in the West, based on particular
historical experiences. It is also true, however, that a similar path can be traced in other
contexts, including those of Arab and Islamic history. This is not to argue, however, that
Arab states’ continuous search for constitutional legitimacy can only be fulfilled through
a return to the past (including to ethnic or religious identities that go beyond all and each
of the concerned Arab states); rather this legitimacy can be realised through their capacity
to project a better future that is partly premised on arguing that certain legal/philosophical
revolutions, irrespective of the place of their formulation, are universally accepted and
applied in contemporary states, and this either does or should include Arab and Muslim
states.
It has not been my concern in this paper to reconcile modern constitutionalism with
Arab and Islamic culture. It was not even my concern to defend modern constitutionalism
Islamically, thus using arguments from within Shari’a to prove that modern
constitutionalism (thus, human rights, democracy, rule of law, and so on) does not
contradict Islam. Rather, my argument is that the core problem lies elsewhere. In my
account, the issue at stake is rather to be able to explain and justify why and how it is
possible for states’ powers to be limited by a superior normative order, notably one in
which human rights is an essential part. Once human rights normativity is also associated
with international law or transnationalised discourses and not merely with the state’s
own positive constitutional law, the just-mentioned issue generates questions of the
following sort. How can we still talk about sovereign states once those sovereigns are
introduced to the domain of legality and when, at the same time, they do not monopolise
the task of defining what is legal and what is illegal? Is it not the end of the very notion
of national states? Is it not contradictory to states’ sovereignty within an interstate system
and to an associated legal supremacy within the state’s own legal order? Does it not
represent a new kind of hegemony (neo-colonialism, imperialism or whatever other
expression can be found in the literature) towards weak states exercised by strong states
450 Transnational Legal Theory
or by international organisations or transnational actors heavily influenced by strong
states or their societies’ norms?
Asking such questions and simultaneously switching the discussion from cultural
and religious exceptionalism to an issue of state sovereignty has the advantage of
relocating the discussion of the nature and content of constitutionalism within the theory
of the state. Most importantly, it has the advantage of avoiding a fallacy that resisting
modern constitutionalism, as a normative order limiting sovereign states, is an exclusive
concern of Arab or Islamic states. Scepticism towards modern constitutionalism is indeed
present elsewhere. Regardless of the varieties of reasons behind such resistance to or
rejection of modern constitutionalism, the argument this paper advances is that the
concerns behind resistance and rejection are largely the same from the perspective of the
theory of the state. The manner in which the reticence of contemporary states to embrace
modern constitutionalism is accompanied by fierce attacks by many scholars on such
reticence explains to a large extent why there is no doctrinal agreement about what
constitutionalism is in the first place. As such, in my account such scepticism, which
frames the issue as one of the legitimacy or coherence of religious or cultural
particularities as the source of resistance to and rejection of modern constitutionalism,
looks at new realities through old lenses.151
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